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Abstract
Using two types of corporate events, a scheduled announcement and
an unscheduled announcement, I investigate the effect of information
asymmetry on trading volume. Only before a scheduled announcement,
such as an earnings announcement, can I observe decreasing trading
volume. I construct a simple theoretical model that suggests how ex
ante information asymmetry and discretionary liquidity trading could
cause the decreasing trading volume only before a scheduled
announcement. Finally, analyzing the relationship between this
decreasing trading volume and proxies of ex ante information
asymmetry, such as analyst coverage, size, and industry categorization,
I test and confirm an information asymmetry hypothesis about the
trading volume pattern before a scheduled announcement.
(Keywords: timing information, information asymmetry, trading
volume)
1. Introduction
When there is an information issuance in the future, informed
investors may have two types of informational advantage over
uninformed liquidity investors. One advantage is provided by
information about future cash flows and the other is by timing
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information of this corporate event. For example, the CEO of
IBM knows a target company that IBM will acquire and knows
the timing of this announcement. In this case, no one except for
informed investors can infer these two kinds of information.
However, there is another type of an announcement, such as an
earnings announcement, whose timing can be anticipated by
even uninformed liquidity investors. Even though liquidity
traders do not know the magnitude of the cash-flow information
from the announcement, they know there will be a considerable
piece of information on a specific day, and this knowledge is
common to everyone in the market. Since liquidity traders lack
only the information about cash flow, they can optimize their
trading with the timing information, as argued in Admati and
Pfleiderer(1988) or Foster and Viswanathan(1990). If higher price
sensitivity or more informed investors in the market are
expected, discretionary liquidity investors will not participate in
trading because of the adverse selection cost. Also, another
important participant, the market maker who sets the price and
maintains its continuity, knows the timing and rationally
expects the existence of strategically behaving liquidity traders.
Therefore, the market maker should consider the less amount of
liquidity trading originated from the behavior of discretionary
liquidity traders.
On the other hand, in the case of an unscheduled
announcement, the market participants other than informed
traders cannot determine when this announcement will be
issued. The discretionary liquidity traders cannot adjust their
behavior prior to the announcement, and informed traders will
have more opportunity to trade strategically. Also, the market
maker cannot rationalize the existence of strategically behaving
discretionary liquidity traders. The difference between the
inferences drawn by the market maker under the two different
circumstances, combined with the existence of discretionary
liquidity traders, raises interesting questions about trading
volume in equilibrium.
Among many scheduled and unscheduled announcements,
this paper deals with earnings announcements and takeover
announcements. I select these two data sets because of the ease
of use; and in addition these two major corporate events have
been widely studied and their impact on return and trading
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volume is considered to be substantial.1)
For documentation about an anticipated information event,
Abraham and Taylor(1997), Kim and Verrecchia(1991a),
Ederington and Lee(1993), and Li and Engle(1998) etc. can be
cited. However, these researchers seldom investigate the trading
volume before an anticipated announcement and never relate it
to ex ante information asymmetry. For example, Ederington and
Lee(1993) examine the impact of scheduled macroeconomic
announcements, such as the employment report, the consumer
price index, and the producer price index, on interest rate and
foreign exchange futures markets. They mostly concentrate on
analyses on volatilies in these markets and do not investigate
trading volume.
Many studies in financial economics and accounting have
developed theoretical models and performed empirical tests
about trading volume. We can roughly categorize those
documents into four different groups.
First, there are summary and/or descriptive papers as
presented by Karpoff(1987). Similarly, Lo and Wang(2000)
provide a systematic description of trading volume data.
Second, the relationship between volatility and trading volume
has been theoretically and empirically studied. For example, the
hypothesis established by Kyle(1985) or Admati and Pfleiderer
(1988) that private information revealed through trading causes
variance is tested by Barclay et al.(1990).2)
Third, there is an effort to interpret trading volume as an
explanatory variable for the cross-sectional variation of expected
return. Lee and Swaminathan(2000) show that trading volume
can indicate the phase of the return process in which a stock is
positioned between the periods favorable for the momentum
strategy and for the value strategy. As a liquidity measure,
Chordia et al.(2001) use the second moment of trading volume
and show that there is a negative cross-sectional relationship
between this measure and stock returns.3)
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1) See Foster, Olsen and Shevlin(1984), Jensen and Ruback(1983), and Jarrell
and Poulsen(1989).
2) For this category, see Gallant, Rossi, and Tauchen(1992), Shalen(1993),
Jones, Kaul and Lipson(1994) etc.
3) As related papers, there are Gervais et al.(2000), Lo and Wang(2001), etc.
Even though some of these papers have a considerably different intuition, all 
Finally, with regard to market microstructure, numerous
studies have been implemented about the relationship among
information asymmetry, trading volume, and stock returns. For
example, Kyle(1985), Bamber(1987), Admati and Pfleiderer
(1988), Atiase and Bamber(1994), Wang(1994), He and Wang
(1995), Foster and Viswanathan(1990), Kim and Verrecchia
(1991a, 1991b, and 1994) are included in this category.
Bamber(1987) tries to link the size of trading volume on an
earnings announcement day with the significance of news.
Atiase and Bamber(1994) follow the hypothesis of Bamber(1987)
and empirically show that there is a positive relationship
between the trading volume on an earnings announcement day
and information asymmetry measured by the analyst coverage.
However, they do not consider how the discretionary liquidity
trader’s behavior is related to the trading volume process before
an announcement. Although Kim and Verrecchia(1994) analyze
the effect on trading volume from an earnings announcement,
they concentrate mostly on ex post information asymmetry
which, according to their hypothesis, results from investors’
different abilities in interpreting the announced information.
This paper, which can be included in the fourth category,
introduces a typical trading volume pattern caused by ex ante
information asymmetry.
Admati and Pfleiderer(1988) theoretically explain the empirical
observation of a U-shaped intraday trading volume through the
argument that discretionary liquidity traders and informed
traders will concentrate their trading in the period when the
price sensitivity from the order flow is the least in the market
maker’s pricing function. Also, Foster and Viswanathan(1990)
extend the result of Admati and Pfleiderer(1988) in a continuous
time model and argue that discretionary liquidity trading is
worthwhile only with a public announcement. However, in these
models, they did not consider the inference problem of the
market maker. 
If discretionary traders trade strategically, the market maker
should rationally expect the level of participating discretionary
liquidity traders. After considering the existence of discretionary
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of them try to use trading volume to explain the cross-sectional variation of
stock returns.
liquidity traders in the market maker’s pricing procedure,4) the
present analysis predicts that the total expected trading volume
will be smaller. Actually, the trading volume will be eventually at
the same level as that in the case of no ex ante discretionary
liquidity traders in the market. Therefore, even though there
exist ex ante discretionary liquidity traders in the market, once
market participants recognize the existence of these
discretionary liquidity traders, all of the discretionary liquidity
traders will in equilibrium escape from the market and the
expected trading volume will be smaller.
In this paper, I not only describe an interesting pattern of
trading volume prior to a scheduled announcement, but also
relate this pattern with ex ante information asymmetry by
applying the results from the present model. If a discretionary
liquidity trader does not recognize much difference between an
informed trader and herself, her cost from deferring trade is
much larger than the expected adverse selection cost, and she
will not escape from the market. Therefore, she continues to
trade and we will not observe the decreased trading volume in
this case. Since the size, the number of analysts, and industry
characteristic of a company can be considered to be a measure
of ex ante information asymmetry before earnings
announcements,5) I use these variables to show the effect of
information asymmetry on trading volume prior to an
announcement. If the size of a company is smaller, fewer
analysts cover a company, or a company is in an industry where
informed investors have more advantage than uninformed
traders before an earnings announcement, I observe that the
trading volume before a scheduled announcement is less.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I describe the
trading volume pattern before different types of announcements.
In section 3, I suggest a simple model that includes the market
maker’s dif ferent pricing function with respect to the
scheduledness of an announcement. With this model, I can
explain the empirical findings in section 2. Section 4 contains
cross-sectional empirical investigations and robustness checks.
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4) This is an added value of this paper to Kyle(1985) or Admati and Pfleiderer 
(1988).
5) For example, see Hong et al.(1998) or Atiase and Bamber(1994).
Finally, in section 5, I offer concluding remarks.
2. Empirical findings
a. Data and description of variables
As a scheduled announcement, I select an earnings
announcement. The empirical studies about the return and
trading volume near earnings announcements are well
documented in many previous works such as Bamber(1987),
Bamber and Cheon(1995) or Foster, Olsen, and Shevlin(1984).
As shown in these studies, we can observe considerable
dynamics in return and trading volume near earnings
announcements. Among other corporate announcements, a
takeover announcement would have as much effect on the
return and trading volume as an earnings announcement. Also,
such announcements are not scheduled, so I select takeover
announcements to exemplify unscheduled announcements.
For the earnings announcement sample, the I/B/E/S
earnings announcement data from 1986 to 1997 are used. From
the I/B/E/S summary files, analysts’ forecasts of earnings per
share(EPS), reported EPS, and reporting dates are extracted. The
total number of earnings announcements during this period is
43,321 all from NYSE and AMEX companies.
The information about acquiring and target companies in
NYSE or AMEX is collected from the SDC database. In order to
match the period, the data only between 1986 and 1997 are
included. Sometimes, the announcement dates are estimated in
the database, but in this analysis, only actual announcement
dates are used. The total number of acquiring companies is
16,854 and that of targeted companies 11,235.
CRSP daily data for all companies in NYSE or AMEX from
1986 to 1997 are combined for these two samples in order to
obtain trading volume.
To control firm-specific characteristics and increase the power
of my tests, I matched the companies between the earnings data
and the takeover data in the robustness check section. By
matching, the companies in the earnings data will have at least
one takeover announcement, and the companies in the takeover
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data will have at least one earnings announcement. After I match
the companies in the earnings announcement sample with those
in the acquisition announcement sample, there are 34,942
earnings announcements and 11,024 acquiring announcements.
With companies existing both earnings announcement data and
target announcement data, there are 30,618 earnings
announcements and 4,877 target announcements. The number
of observations after each filter is given in Table 1.
Since there are various measures of trading volume, one needs
to be chosen. Since trading volume can be affected by the
number of outstanding shares, I use turnover defined as in
equation (1).6) In this article, “trading volume” and “turnover”
will be used interchangeably.
(1)
The percentage deviation from the median turnover for the
previous 30 trading days is used for the abnormal trading
volume measure in this study and is defined as in equation (2).
The reason to use a median in this analysis is large skewness
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Table 1. Data sets and applied filters
NYSE and AMEX Earningsa Acquisitionb Targetc
Before # of Obs. Filter 43,321 16,854 11,235
After # of Obs. Filter 41,697 15,134 8,448
After Matching with Acquisition 34,942 11,024 N/A
After Matching with Target 30,618 N/A 4,877
a. The earnings announcement data between 1986 and 1997 are
extracted from the I/B/E/S database. The companies had to be in the
NYSE and the AMEX.
b. The Acquiring and the target announcement data between 1986 and
1997 are from the SDC database.
c. At least 40 observations before an announcement and 10
observations after the announcement exist.
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(2)
In order to define abnormal trading volume and estimate it in
an announcement window, I need at least 51 trading-day
observations. Therefore, in all samples, only companies with 51
days of non-missing turnover are included in the final data set.
To make an inference about abnormal trading volume, I
compare median abnormal turnover from day t-10 to day t+10
with a bootstrapped distribution. Since the trading volume is
highly autocorrelated,7) I need to preserve the time series
property when I generate a bootstrapped distribution.8) I
consider a block bootstrapping where the time series property of
a series is sustained. Generating 630 random dates9) and a
random number of companies for each announcement day, I
calculate 21-day abnormal trading volume series in each
bootstrapping iteration. The p-values in tables are from the
bootstrapped distribution of 1000 replications.
b. Empirical results
I obtain the median cross-sectional percentage deviation using
median abnormal turnovers (ξi,t) from each company and make
an inference using the bootstrapped distribution. Since turnover
has a very fat tail (kurtosis is greater than 100) and an extreme
positive skewness (greater than 7), a median would be a better
estimator of a normal level of turnover than a mean.
The level of abnormal turnover in the period t-10 to t-3 is
statistically significant with around 1% to 10% p-value for a one-
side test as shown in Table 2. I find that a decrease of around 2
to 3% of daily trading volume, on average, prior to an earnings
announcement. For summary measure, I construct the average
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7) See Lo and Wang(2000).
8) Efron and Tibshirani(1983) provide a textbook for the bootstrap technique.
9) This is one quarter of observations in the original earnings announcements
data.
t-3 and observe that the negative turnover is large enough with
p-value of much less than 1%. This implies that low turnover in
a day is noticeable, but more importantly, a continuous streak of
low turnover in this period is extraordinary.
To make it clear that the time series property of trading
volume before a scheduled earnings announcement is
extraordinary, I compare the result from earnings
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Table 2. Median abnormal turnover around events
Announcements Earning Acquisition Target
No.of Obs. 41,697 15,134 8,448
t = –10 –1.024(0.094) 0.000(0.441) 5.747(0.000)
–9 –2.829(0.012) 0.919(0.044) 4.313(0.000)
–8 –2.515(0.030) 0.690(0.059) 6.255(0.000)
–7 –2.941(0.012) 1.155(0.034) 10.624(0.000)
–6 –2.837(0.014) 1.696(0.024) 11.565(0.000)
–5 –2.310(0.031) 0.527(0.064) 12.448(0.000)
–4 –1.673(0.052) 2.531(0.005) 14.496(0.000)
–3 –2.122(0.032) 0.658(0.064) 18.462(0.000)
–2 0.000(0.431) 2.921(0.005) 22.721(0.000)
–1 11.770(0.000) 6.725(0.000) 27.012(0.000)
0 46.868(0.000) 29.468(0.000) 119.461(0.000)
1 39.375(0.000) 26.445(0.000) 103.653(0.000)
2 19.184(0.000) 14.372(0.000) 59.521(0.000)
3 12.874(0.000) 9.415(0.000) 42.037(0.000)
4 10.006(0.000) 7.768(0.000) 31.650(0.000)
5 8.794(0.000) 6.225(0.000) 29.088(0.000)
6 6.017(0.000) 6.015(0.001) 23.904(0.000)
7 4.970(0.000) 3.401(0.007) 21.767(0.000)
8 3.108(0.004) 3.025(0.004) 17.623(0.000)
9 3.907(0.003) 1.606(0.042) 13.582(0.000)
t = 10 4.016(0.000) 1.734(0.023) 14.413(0.000)
Average of t = [–10, –3] –2.281(0.001) 1.022(0.006) 9.411(0.000)
The abnormal turnover around each announcement from the companies
in the NYSE and the AMEX between 1986 and 1997 is the percentage
change between the annualized percentage turnover and the median
annualized percentage turnover from t = –40 to t = –11. The p-values in
parentheses are estimated from the bootstrapped distribution with 1000
iterations. They stand for the tail probability of the smaller side, i.e.,
their maximum is 0.5.
announcements with the results from two kinds of takeover
announcements: an announcement that a firm is acquiring and
an announcement that a firm is being targeted.10) Obviously, the
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(a)                                                    (b)
(c)                                                    (d)
Figure 1. Cumulative median abnormal turnover from t = –10 to t = 10
In each announcement, percentage median abnormal turnovers
compared to the median turnover from t = –40 to t = –11 are drawn. For
Plot (d), the 72nd day from each earnings announcement is selected so
that neither the estimaition window nor the event window includes an
earnings announcement.
10) I also examined 411 Moody’s bond rating change announcements in 1997
and 1998. As expected, I could not observe the same pattern of trading
volume as we can see in an earnings announcement. The turnover is almost
stable or increased until the announcement day and increased on 
time series patterns of these two announcements are different
from those of scheduled earnings announcements. There is no
negative abnormal trading volume prior to either type of
announcement. Before these announcements, we can even
observe statistically significant positive abnormal trading
volume.11) Compared with acquiring or target announcements
where the trading volume increased prior to those
announcements, the significance of the decreased trading
volume before an earnings announcement is conspicuous.
For summary, I provide a plot of cumulative abnormal
percentage turnover in the period from t = –10 to t = 10. In
Figure 1(a), for 8 consecutive days, the turnover before an
earnings announcement decreases about 20% cumulatively.
However, in Figure 1(b) and 1(c) for acquiring and target
announcements, we cannot observe any decrease pattern in the
turnover for this period. Morever, the turnover has been
increased considerably. In order to confirm that the measure of
the abnormal turnover is appropriate, I choose a non-
announcement day (here, 72nd day from each earnings
announcement day) and a random number of companies from
the earnings announcement data set, and do the same
procedure as in the above investigation about three kinds of
announcements. I carefully select the day so that the estimation
and the event window do not include any earnings
announcement date. In this case, only stable patterns of
abnormal trading volume near zero can be observed, as shown
in Figure 1(d). Therefore, our measure of abnormal turnover
does not seem to be biased.
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announcment days. Since Moody’s rating change seems to follow the change
of companies performance, the rating change can be expected and this might
make it unclear the pattern of trading volume near an “unexpected”
information announcement. 
11) For an explanation of this positive trading volume, see Sanders and
Zdanowicz(1992) or Jayaraman et al.(2001) etc.
3. Simple model
a. Model description
I suggest the following model to provide a theoretical
explanation for the extraordinary trading volume pattern
described in the previous section. This model is a simple
extension of Kyle(1985) or Admati and Pfleiderer(1988), but
contains an interesting feature regarding the market maker’s
inference and its result. I compare the two results from different
assumptions about the knowledge of market participants.
There are four different player groups in this model: informed
traders(IT), discretionary liquidity traders(DLT), naive liquidity
traders(NLT), and a market maker(MM).
We begin by assuming that n informed traders, the IT, have
the same information. The IT’s information will be assumed to
be δ̃ + ε̃, where δ̃ is a normally distributed dividend with mean of
zero in the final payoff, = + δ̃ (here, is a constant part of
final payoff), and ε̃, also normally distributed with mean of zero,
is the noise in the IT’s signal. With her information, δ̃ + ε̃, a risk-
neutral IT decides her trading amount to maximize her final
payoff. At the Nash equilibrium, an IT will submit a market
order of  x̃i = βi ( δ̃ + ε̃ ).
Along with the IT, I assume that there are two types of
liquidity traders, discretionary liquidity traders(DLT) and naive
liquidity traders(NLT). These liquidity traders submit order flows
ỹ and z̃, respectively. These two variables have mean of zero and
positive variance. Only the DLT can react to the timing
information in the market, i.e., they can react to the price
sensitivity in MM’s pricing function with consideration of their
waiting cost.12) If they recognize that the adverse selection cost is
too high for their waiting cost, they will defer their order.
Therefore, the concept of the DLT is justified only when they
know the scheduled time of an information release. I conjecture
 F F F̃
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12) We can regard the DLT as investors who have relatively smaller waiting costs
compared to the NLT when these two classes of uninformed liquidity
investors want to defer a trade.
the equilibrium reaction from the DLT to be ,
where 
—λ is the maximum price sensitivity that can be reached
when every DLT is ex ante out of the market and only the NLT
remain.
The MM will set prices with the zero expected profit condition,
as in Kyle(1985). The MM’s decision is also affected by the
timing information. If the MM cannot justify the existence of the
DLT, and if even she does not know whether an announcement
is impending or not, she will not consider the possibility of
decreasing order flow from the DLT related to the size of the
price sensitivity she will decide. Therefore, she will set up a
pricing equation without any expectation of decreasing order
flow from the DLT, as in Equation 3. In this case, the DLT end
up behaving like the NLT.
Case 1: Unscheduled announcement
In this case, the DLT without timing information will behave
like the NLT.
where, (3)
If the MM knows when an announcement is to be issued, she
rationally expects the existence of the DLT and reflects this in
her inferences about the total order flow. Since the DLT do not
want to trade much when the price sensitivity to the order flow
is high, the MM will presume the smaller order flow from the
DLT and set a different price sensitivity using the estimated
DLT’s order flow. This feature is formulated in Equation 4 as the
presumed order flow, . This MM’s improved price-setting
mechanism will generate less variation of the price in the market
and be consistent with one of the goals of the MM, maintaining
the price continuity. To determine the maximum price
sensitivity, 
—λ in Equation 4, the case where there is no DLT ex
ante should be investigated. In this case, the price sensitivity (
—λ)
will be decided from Equation 5.
 Ω̃S
˜ ˜ ˜ΩU i
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Case 2: Scheduled announcement
Both DLT and NLT exist and only the DLT react to the price
sensitivity.
where, (4)
Case 3: Benchmark case
In this case, there exists only the NLT ex ante.
where, (5)
According to the three cases, the price sensitivity to the order
flow and the trading aggressiveness of the IT can be summarized
in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1
If the MM knows the existence of DLT who are using a linear
strategy of participation in the market, i.e., as in Case 2, the price
sensitivity (λS) and IT’s trading aggressiveness (βS) in equilibrium
will be the same as those from the limiting case, i.e., Case 3.
Therefore, the price sensitivity in Case 2 is always larger than
that in Case 1 and the trading aggressiveness in Case 2 is
always less than that in Case 1.13)
(6)
(7)
The interesting result is that this equilibrium value of λS and
βS is the same as the limiting values (—λ and ) from the case
where there are no ex ante DLT and only the NLT exist. Since
rationally behaving market participants with timing information
β
β β βS U= <
 λ λ λS U= >
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13) The proof for Lemma 1 is shown at the Appendix.
will drive the values of λ and β to the limiting values of Case 3,
and thus, all of the DLT will escape from the market, in
equilibrium.
With the equilibrium values of the price sensitivity and the
trading aggressiveness, I measure the expected trading volume
in the market in two cases, a scheduled announcement and an
unscheduled announcement. I use the same volume measure as
used in Admati and Pfleiderer(1988) or Foster and Viswanathan
(1990). This measure is considered to be reasonable since it
reflects the trading volume even between market participants
other than the MM.
Proposition 1
If the MM can rationally expect the existence of the DLT, the




The reason for smaller trading volume in the case of a
scheduled announcement is the DLT’s escape from the market
and the smaller trading volume from the IT. 
Proof. Following the definition in Admati and Pfleiderer(1988)
with βS, λS, βU, and λU in Lemma 1, we can calculate the
expected trading volume using the variance of order flows from
IT, DLT, and NLT and also the variance of total order flow
observed by MM. Since the calculation of this is trivial, I save it
for brevity. Q.E.D. 
b. Implications of the model
With parameter values of Var(δ̃) = 0.1, Var(ỹ ) = 0.2, Var(z̃ ) =
0.2, and different values of Var( ε̃ ) and n, the numerical values of
λ and β from Lemma 1 are plotted in Figure 2. Plots (a) and (b)
V nVar y Var z Var y Var z
n Var y Var z
U = + + +
+ + +
( ˜) ( ˜) ( ˜) ( ˜)
        ( )( ( ˜) ( ˜))1
 V nVar z Var z n Var z
S = + + +( ˜) ( ˜) ( ) ( ˜)1
 V VS U<
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are for the price sensitivity to the order flow in the MM’s pricing
function and the trading aggressiveness in IT’s order flow
function. Plot (c) shows that the trading volume with scheduled
announcements will be less than that with unscheduled ones. If
I slice Plot (c) at Var( ε̃ ) = 0.05, as in Plot (d), the relation between
the expected trading volume and the number of the IT would be
clearly demonstrated; if the number of IT is larger, the trading
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(a)                                                     (b)
(c)                                                     (d)
“Price sensitivity” is denoted by λ, “Trading aggressiveness” by β, and
“Noise in information” by Var(ε̃ ). In (d), the noise in information (Var(ε̃ ))
is fixed at 0.05.
Figure 2. Numerical results of the model.
volume will be larger. With clear pictures of the proposition, I
can state several testable hypotheses.
As a main hypothesis, the decreased trading volume before a
scheduled announcement results from the discretionary liquidity
trading generated from information asymmetry. Therefore, there
should be a cross-sectional relationship between any measure of
information asymmetry and the observed decreasing trading
volume before a scheduled earnings announcement. Also, as
shown in Figure 2(a), the price sensitivity to the order flow must
be increased before an earnings announcement.
In the following section, I will investigate the relationship
between the decreasing trading volume and both several
information asymmetry proxies and the price sensitivity to the
order flow. To support the information asymmetry explanation
for the decreased trading volume, I provide another analysis
related to risk measures around an announcement.
4. Cross-sectional analysis and robustness check
a. Cross-sectional analysis
Since I cannot directly measure the information asymmetry in
the market, I investigate the relationship between the trading
volume and several variables known to be good proxies for the
information asymmetry, such as size, analyst coverage, and
industry group.
As shown in Table 3, the decreasing trading volume before an
earnings announcement disappears if more analysts cover a
company. For example, before earnings announcements, when
there are less than 6 analysts covering the companies, the
turnover is decreasing almost 4% daily between t = –10 and t =
–3, but when there are more than 10 analysts covering the
companies, the turnover seems to slightly increase (daily 0.8%)
in the same period. This relationship between the trading
volume and the number of analysts is consistent with the
hypothesis that there should be more trading accomplished
when there is less information asymmetry before a scheduled
announcement because the liquidity traders will stay in the
market. Since analysts post their forecasts in various media,
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individual investors can always obtain this information easily. If
investors cannot find information with relatively small cost, they
will consider themselves uninformed and will not participate in
the market. In this case, discretionary liquidity traders prefer
waiting for the scheduled information issuances.
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Table 3. Median abnormal turnover according to the number of
analyst estimation
No.of Est. 1-3 4-6 7-9 >9 Missing
No.of Obs. 16,896 9,068 5,942 6,718 1,621
t=-10 -2.908++ -0.344 -1.347+++ 1.564** -3.116+
-9 -4.177+ -4.178+ -2.685++ 0.383*** -2.596++
-8 -3.244+ -4.818+ -3.052++ 0.464*** -3.273+
-7 -4.567+ -3.854+ -3.354+ 0.353*** -3.615+
-6 -4.165+ -4.140+ -3.012+ 0.569*** -3.725+
-5 -4.325+ -4.682+ -1.379+++ 0.621*** -0.510
-4 -1.660+++ -3.861+ -3.888+ 1.098** -0.738
-3 -2.921++ -3.810+ -2.675++ 1.314** -2.905++
-2 0.000 -2.904++ -1.182+++ 3.587* 1.368**
-1 13.271* 8.390* 11.616* 12.854* 6.921*
0 52.031* 44.755* 44.753* 46.212* 31.571*
1 41.690* 40.071* 36.505* 40.107* 28.563*
2 19.481* 19.260* 18.943* 19.476* 17.067*
3 13.584* 13.404* 13.102* 11.592* 8.853*
4 10.761* 11.518* 10.628* 7.603* 6.687*
5 9.628* 11.148* 7.919* 7.446* 4.892*
6 6.647* 5.431* 5.763* 6.222* 3.894*
7 5.483* 6.415* 5.210* 2.638** 6.406*
8 3.613* 5.050* 1.982** 1.401** 4.915*
9 5.506* 3.333* 4.330* 1.633** 2.083**
t=10 3.722* 5.942* 3.147** 3.388* 3.596*
Average of t=[–10, –3] -3.496 -3.711 -2.674 0.796 -2.560
p-value 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.011 -0.001
For the abnormal trading volume (ξi,t), the median turnover from t = –40 to t =
–11 is calculated and subtracted from the turnover in the event window. The
turnover is an annualized and percentage number of trading volume divided by
shares outstanding. No. of Est. means the number of analysts who forecast the
earnings announcement. +++, ++, and + mean respectively 10%, 5%, and 1% in
the left tail of the bootstrapped distribution. ***, **, and * mean respectively
10%, 5%, and 1% in the right tail of the bootstrapped distribution.
Escape from the Market: Discretionary Liquidity Trading 45
Table 4. Median abnormal turnover according to the size quintile
Date Small(20%) 2 3 4 Large(20%)
Earningsannouncements
No.of Obs. 6,900 8,842 9,121 8,804 9,238
t=(-10,-3) -3.659+ -4.347+ -3.510+ -2.019+ -0.180
-2 1.597** -1.053 -1.083 -0.163 2.156**
-1 18.132* 12.267* 9.377* 11.074* 11.635*
0 76.471* 55.176* 44.677* 45.088* 38.974*
1 51.875* 47.050* 42.959* 39.623* 31.205*
2 26.904* 20.593* 21.465* 20.099* 16.447*
t=[3,10] 8.667* 9.738* 7.357* 7.242* 5.108*
Acquiring announcements
No.of Obs. 2,949 2,664 2,781 2,892 3,848
t=[-10, -3] 2.775* 1.880* -0.331 1.862* 0.226
-2 6.977* 2.922* 4.939* -0.016 1.873**
-1 18.610* 5.940* 6.811* 4.619* 3.834*
0 70.902* 40.555* 31.907* 21.299* 14.507*
1 56.373* 29.049* 32.693* 22.555* 15.871*
2 29.809* 15.543* 13.750* 15.596* 10.046*
t=[3, 10] 8.540* 4.369* 4.580* 5.275* 3.987*
Target announcements
No.of Obs. 3,303 1,841 1,537 1,543 1,821
t=[-10, -3] 15.070* 18.640* 13.404* 14.836* 8.688*
-2 33.333* 26.272* 32.697* 27.378* 15.903*
-1 42.941* 38.881* 36.569* 31.058* 17.864*
0 223.530* 200.640* 143.240* 108.080* 65.968*
1 203.700* 156.350* 136.170* 96.457* 47.411*
2 113.830* 87.726* 75.844* 57.727* 28.221*
t=[3, 10] 35.443* 40.077* 42.600* 28.136* 14.995*
For the abnormal trading volume(ξi,t), the median turnover from t=-40 to
t=-11 is calculated and subtracted from the turnover in the event
window. The turnover is an annualized and percentage number of
trading volume divided by shares outstanding. Size break points are
from Ken French’s data base in http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.
edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/. +++, ++, and + mean respectively 10%,
5%, and 1% in the left tail of the bootstrapped distribution. ***, **, and *
mean respectively 10%, 5%, and 1% in the right tail of the bootstrapped
distribution.
Since the size of a company has been used as a proxy of
information asymmetry in many studies(e.g. Hong, Lim and
Stein(1998)), investigation of the relationship between the size of
a company and the trading volume prior to each announcement
is worthwhile. In Table 4, I report the result from an analysis
using a size quintile offered by Ken French. As expected, only
before an earnings announcement, can I notice the decreasing
trading volume pattern, and this pattern is generally positively
related to the company size.14) In the smaller quintiles, around
3-4% decrease of trading volume is observed and, in the larger
quintiles, the amount of decreased trading volume is attenuated
to be about 1% or less.
Since the size of a company is believed to be related to the
amount of analyst coverage, I investigate the trading volume
pattern with respect to the company size and the analyst
coverage in Table 5. I group the companies into 12 categories
according to the size of the companies on t = –10 and the
number of analysts. The sorting is done independently with the
company size and the number of analysts. Between these two
related variables, the number of analysts clearly gives the
expected relationship with the decreasing trading volume
pattern before an earnings announcement. On average, trading
volume is decreased daily by 3 to 5% during the period of t = –10
to t = –3, and the degree of this decrease is monotonically
weakened as the number of analysts increases in each size
group. Only in the largest companies, does the number of
analysts not show this same pattern of the trading volume.
According to the nature of a company’s business, the earnings
announcements from one company may not give as much new
information as those from another company. For example, before
an earnings announcement from a clothing company,
uninformed traders have much less amount of information
compared to an earnings announcement from a petroleum
company. The performance of a petroleum company is heavily
dependent on the market price of oil. This price is readily
46 Seoul Journal of Business
14) Another interesting feature of this Table 4 is that the trading volume before
an acquiring announcement and a target announcement is negatively related
to the size of a company. This implies that there will be a different trading
mechanism in those announcements compared to an earnings
announcement.
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Table 6. Median abnormal turnover according to industry
Date Agriculture, Construction, Food, Textile, Logging, Chemical Petroleum
Forest, Material Tobacco Clothing, Paper
Fish, Mine Consumption Publishing
Earnings announcement matching with acquiring
No.of Obs. 1,587 2,992 1,029 1,655 1,915 2,032 384
t=[-10, -3] -1.187++ -3.004+ -3.144+ -6.163+ -0.564 -1.773+ 4.466*
-2 -1.332+++ -0.280 -2.125++ 2.356** 0.517 0.000 -4.943+
-1 5.765* 14.539* 10.320* 25.311* 11.564* 13.228* 4.703*
0 24.027* 46.430* 37.905* 72.594* 45.589* 39.972* 12.802*
1 16.217* 36.619* 30.084* 59.485* 38.376* 31.296* 7.725*
2 11.084* 21.571* 16.687* 29.324* 18.832* 15.934* 7.881*
t=[3, 10] -0.009 7.474* 5.145* 8.009* 9.640* 3.866* -0.795++
Acquiring announcement matching with earnings
No.of Obs. 384 687 378 381 581 693 62
t=[-10, -3] 2.574* 3.884* 0.666** 4.575* 0.363 0.267 7.850*
-2 -2.022+++ 9.271* 1.941 0.148 6.542* 3.847* 2.118**
-1 8.711* 16.173* 8.643* 10.112* 3.588* 4.657* 5.086*
0 41.383* 40.724* 14.741* 46.301* 20.283* 18.749* 3.391*
1 31.017* 36.990* 17.211* 44.621* 25.921* 16.633* 22.921*
2 15.853* 20.679* 5.078* 29.551* 8.387* 11.402* 20.028*
t=[3, 10] 8.415* 8.217* 1.087* 7.315* 1.373* 1.998* 8.499*
Earnings announcement with target
No.of Obs. 1,286 2,461 995 1,598 1,764 1,914 341
t=[-10, -3] 0.130 -2.729+ -2.825+ -5.991+ -0.750++ -1.410+ 3.871*
-2 -1.310+++ 0.714 -1.526+++ 2.429** 1.589** 0.706 -4.495+
-1 7.225* 13.565* 10.384* 26.727* 11.687* 13.286* 1.243*
0 24.973* 44.253* 37.905* 72.674* 44.160* 40.904* 12.510*
1 15.729* 35.003* 29.613* 60.443* 38.727* 33.650* 5.550*
2 12.015* 20.607* 15.874* 29.616* 18.055* 17.160* 5.762*
t=[3, 10] -0.115 7.218* 4.548* 7.725* 9.870* 4.163* -2.366+
Target announcement matching with earnings
No.of Obs. 180 423 160 263 261 352 67
t=[-10, -3] 10.848* 24.198* 8.660* 10.813* 9.332* 4.912* 14.448*
-2 10.174* 43.478* 20.283* 17.416* 29.424* 19.275* 17.188*
-1 10.804* 40.000* 19.477* 46.274* 23.774* 15.126* 7.100*
0 82.141* 159.870* 79.557* 204.150* 59.593* 70.790* 49.852*
1 52.925* 110.340* 49.159* 174.700* 47.411* 37.448* 92.991*
2 61.633* 48.000* 30.666* 81.343* 20.502* 37.779* 34.135*
t=[3, 10] 26.751* 29.792* 2.291* 20.478* 10.441* 11.423* 2.426*
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Table 6. continued
Date Machinery, Trans- Utility Wholesale Finance Conglomerate
Equipment, portation Telecommuni- Retail Entertainment
Computer cation Services
Earnings announcement matching with acquiring
No.of Obs. 4,606 1,384 1,930 3,250 4,218 2,384
t=[-10, -3] -0.869++ -2.506+ -2.196+ -1.980+ -3.497+ -1.333++
-2 4.124* 0.345 1.972** 2.663* -0.852 0.035
-1 18.963* 16.304* 4.556* 18.307* 11.286* 13.813*
0 65.702* 49.940* 16.040* 64.900* 42.073* 67.774*
1 51.309* 36.373* 16.979* 50.924* 38.784* 52.481*
2 20.908* 19.279* 9.200* 24.992* 18.628* 20.899*
t=[3, 10] 8.756* 4.374* 6.066* 7.212* 5.639* 6.040*
Acquiring announcement matching with earnings
No.of Obs. 1,398 394 323 727 1,461 867
t=[-10, -3] 3.621* 0.582 3.717* -0.670+++ 0.388 -3.265+
-2 5.328* -1.702+++ 1.227** 0.000 1.017** 1.083**
-1 9.347* 9.179* 10.965* -1.446+++ 7.392* 0.470***
0 27.854* 27.941* 15.525* 38.802* 23.832* 37.612*
1 25.427* 20.555* 11.813* 28.094* 22.396* 34.601*
2 12.416* 3.099* 12.829* 15.438* 11.683* 18.640*
t=[3, 10] 5.941* 3.613* 3.809* 1.567* 3.276* 4.463*
Earnings announcement with target
No.of Obs. 4,490 1,488 1,540 2,958 3,639 2,057
t=[-10, -3] -1.127++ -1.689+ -1.509+ -2.648+ -3.278+ -0.914++
-2 3.156* 1.345** 2.021** 1.722** -1.631+++ -1.831+++
-1 16.548* 16.430* 5.040* 17.883* 11.045* 15.301*
0 62.869* 50.000* 19.956* 62.082* 43.051* 65.600*
1 51.229* 37.999* 19.162* 49.721* 40.356* 51.445*
2 21.615* 19.950* 9.938* 22.637* 18.092* 19.850*
t=[3, 10] 8.030* 5.716* 7.944* 7.466* 6.103* 6.136*
Target announcement matching with earnings
No.of Obs. 758 296 143 418 686 390
t=[-10, -3] 9.554* 9.790* 8.538* 11.588* 10.783* 11.907*
-2 26.073* 9.401* 22.838* 23.887* 24.938* 28.885*
-1 25.353* 24.176* 18.023* 25.192* 22.931* 33.281*
0 116.660* 113.450* 51.037* 143.990* 85.217* 138.780*
1 89.901* 91.236* 58.765* 110.490* 59.905* 137.240*
2 46.141* 38.539* 51.240* 50.049* 32.869* 77.549*
t=[3, 10] 15.131* 22.762* 21.073* 21.287* 13.554* 36.220*
For the abnormal trading volume(ξi,t), the median turnover from t = –40 to t = –11 is
calculated and subtracted from the turnover in the event window. The turnover is an
annualized and percentage number of trading volume divided by shares outstanding.
The industry categorization method is from Lewellen(1999). +++, ++, and + mean
respectively 10%, 5%, and 1% in the left tail of the bootstrapped distribution. ***, **,
and * mean respectively 10%, 5%, and 1% in the right tail of the bootstrapped
distribution.
available and oil futures market provides considerable
information to every investor in the market. The uninformed
traders or discretionary liquidity traders do not need to react to
this oil company’s earnings announcement as much as to an
earnings announcement of another company whose performance
they cannot easily estimate. As shown in Table 6, prior to the
earnings announcement from a petroleum company, uninformed
traders do not worry about the informed traders’ informational
advantage and stay in the market. We can also observe this
phenomenon in industries such as agriculture, paper, and
retailing industries, which have relatively widely published
information about the future cash flows of the company before
their earnings announcements, even though the time series
patterns in those industries are not as clear as ones in the
petroleum industry.
For the price sensitivity measure, absolute return divided by
absolute turnover is used. Even though this measure does not
exactly match the concept of λ in the model, using it still gives
the same qualitative implications and greater convenience of the
test. Since a turnover can sometimes be zero, if there is a non-
zero return with a zero turnover, I arbitrarily assign a large
number. Since I measure the normal level of the price sensitivity
using median values, this arbitrarily large number does not
cause any bias, if we can assume that the price sensitivity in
this case is at least larger than the median.
Price Sensitivity (10)
For abnormal price sensitivity, I use a similar measure to the
abnormal trading volume. It is defined as the percentage
deviation from the median price sensitivity from the previous 30
trading days as shown in Equation 11. If the median of 30-day
price sensitivity is zero, I exclude that data series from the
sample. This will definitely create a bias in the sample, but the
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Abnormal Price Sensitivity (ϕi,t)(%) 
(11)
In Table 7, we can observe higher price sensitivity only prior to
earnings announcements. The p-value is also around 1 to 5%
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Table 7. Median abnormal price sensitivity around events
Date Earning Acquisition Target
No.of Obs. 41,689 15,120 8,448
-10 0.952(0.142) -0.099(0.012) -4.204(0.000)
-9 2.595(0.044) -0.766(0.005) -6.057(0.000)
-8 2.936(0.030) -2.258(0.001) -7.119(0.000)
-7 3.514(0.021) -0.381(0.008) -6.044(0.000)
-6 1.850(0.074) -0.578(0.009) -8.007(0.000)
-5 2.030(0.064) 0.000(0.413) -9.541(0.000)
-4 3.453(0.017) -0.442(0.014) -11.992(0.000)
-3 4.520(0.007) 0.000(0.412) -11.814(0.000)
-2 2.305(0.038) -0.358(0.020) -14.570(0.000)
-1 -0.730(0.012) -1.700(0.005) -16.351(0.000)
0 -14.862(0.000) -13.383(0.000) -35.390(0.000)
1 -17.074(0.000) -14.090(0.000) -41.810(0.000)
2 -11.811(0.000) -12.094(0.000) -36.988(0.000)
3 -7.538(0.000) -7.516(0.000) -27.763(0.000)
4 -6.722(0.000) -7.451(0.000) -22.484(0.000)
5 -6.787(0.000) -6.102(0.000) -25.939(0.000)
6 -5.149(0.000) -4.133(0.000) -20.172(0.000)
7 -4.773(0.000) -5.339(0.000) -17.540(0.000)
8 -3.146(0.002) -3.772(0.001) -13.246(0.000)
9 -2.391(0.006) -3.132(0.002) -9.214(0.000)
10 -2.863(0.002) -2.352(0.007) -12.169(0.000)
Average of t=[-10, -3] 2.731(0.000) -0.566(0.002) -8.097(0.000)
The abnormal price sensitivity around each announcement from the
companies in the NYSE and the AMEX between 1986 and 1997 is the
percentage change between the price sensitivity and the median price
sensitivity from t = –40 to t = –11. The p-values are estimated from the
bootstrapped distribution with 1000 iterations. They stand for the tail
probability of the smaller side, i.e., their maximum is 0.5.
announcement or a target announcement, a scheduled earnings
announcement drives liquidity traders to become discretionary
and the market maker to recognize the existence of these
discretionary liquidity traders, as shown in the model. Therefore,
the price sensitivity will be higher only before scheduled
announcements. This result also supports the information
asymmetry explanation of the decreased trading volume before
an earnings announcement.
b. Other explanations of decreased trading volume
Given various empirical results about the increasing volatility
around earnings announcements(e.g., Donders and Vorst
(1996)), there may exist other explanations about the reasons for
the decreased trading volume before scheduled earnings
announcements. In a hypothetical world in which there is no
information asymmetry, investors will trade securities with
allocational and/or liquidity motives. If investors with
allocational motives know there will be higher risk in the future,
they may have an incentive to change their position and
generate trading volume in the market. Even though this
explanation requires several assumptions about investors, such
as risk averse investors, it is worthwhile to check if there is
another explanation for the decreased trading volume before an
earnings announcement.
In Table 8, I group the companies into quintiles according to
the standard deviations or betas15) estimated from the periods t
= –70 to –11 or from t = 11 to t = 70.16) With the risk-averse
investor explanation, less turnover should be observed with the
higher volatility or beta estimated especially in the post-
announcement period. However, as shown in the table, we
cannot find the anticipated relationship between the trading
volume and risk measures, such as the standard deviation of
return or the beta. Therefore, I believe that I can exclude the
possibility of the risk-based explanation of the decreasing
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15) Since there might be an incorrect estimation of beta because of infrequent
trading in daily data, I used Dimson(1979)’s adjusted beta.
16) I also implement alternative windows of t = –1 to –70 and t = 1 to 70 or t = –1
to –150 and t = 1 to 150 for the pre and the post period. The results were
almost the same.
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Table 8. Abnormal turnover according to risk measures
Date Small 2 3 4 Large
Volatility between t=-70 and t=-11
No. Obs. 8,260 8,488 8,744 8,447 8,488
t=[-10, -3] -0.578 -2.086+ -1.405+ -6.991+ 0.937
-2 5.149* 0.000 -1.116* -5.553+ 5.207*
-1 15.648* 12.086* 10.043* 9.266* 14.595*
0 58.668* 42.419* 41.570* 40.189* 58.882*
1 53.386* 35.945* 34.925* 29.261* 51.088*
2 28.064* 18.755* 12.899* 13.187* 28.176*
t=[3, 10] 13.375* 5.819* 2.100* 2.179* 13.957*
Volatility between t=11 and t=70
No. Obs. 8,360 8,579 8,517 8,477 8,494
t=[-10, -3] -4.26+ 0.796 -1.539+ -4.165+ -0.584
-2 -2.023++ 4.118* 1.414** -2.107++ 1.150**
-1 12.307* 14.497* 15.415* 6.660* 11.905*
0 45.546* 54.020* 52.968* 40.205* 46.782*
1 33.531* 49.045* 42.479* 33.749* 44.254*
2 13.192* 28.620* 23.432* 12.899* 22.963*
t=[3, 10] 4.324* 9.001* 9.398* 1.283* 11.791*
Beta between t=-70 and t=-11
No. Obs. 8,485 8,486 8,485 8,486 8,485
t=[-10, -3] -1.931+ -1.27++ -1.359++ -2.436+ -2.758+
-2 -1.000 1.054* 0.000 0.486*** 2.355**
-1 5.167* 8.688* 12.133* 14.122* 19.221*
0 44.971* 45.055* 45.293* 48.982* 54.892*
1 39.092* 41.897* 39.861* 39.473* 41.976*
2 21.081* 18.419* 20.498* 21.860* 19.018*
t=[3, 10] 8.079* 8.915* 6.973* 6.361* 5.644*
Beta between t=11 and t=70
No. Obs. 8,485 8,486 8,485 8,486 8,485
t=[-10, -3] -3.412+ -2.356+ -2.204+ -0.952++ -0.861+++
-2 -1.195+++ -0.644 -0.131 3.045* 2.569*
-1 5.700* 10.833* 11.441* 15.693* 15.889*
0 41.408* 44.928* 46.629* 48.346* 58.250*
1 34.253* 39.305* 43.238* 41.517* 44.391*
2 19.117* 18.691* 20.413* 20.244* 22.614*
t=[3, 10] 6.405* 7.180* 7.826* 7.779* 6.410*
For the abnormal trading volume (ξi,t), the median turnover from t = –40
to t = –11 is calculated and subtracted from the turnover in the event
window. The turnover is an annualized and percentage number of
trading volume divided by shares outstanding. No. of Est. means the
number of analysts who forecast the earnings announcement. +++, ++,
and + mean respectively 10%, 5%, and 1% in the left tail of the
bootstrapped distribution. ***, **, and * mean respectively 10%, 5%,
and 1% in the right tail of the bootstrapped distribution. The used risk
measures are volatility and beta estimated from t = –70 to t = –11.
trading volume before a scheduled announcement.
c. Robustness check
Since I compare different announcement databases, there
might be unobserved different characteristics of companies in
each announcement sample. To control for any firm-specific
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Table 9. Median abnormal turnover around events after matching
Announcements Earnings Acquisition Earnings Target
matchingwith acquiring earnings target earnings
No.of Obs. 34,942 11,024 30,618 4,877
t=-10 -0.870(0.106) 0.396(0.045) -0.939(0.103) 4.451(0.000)
-9 -2.904(0.011) 0.363(0.064) -2.670(0.014) 3.028(0.000)
-8 -2.801(0.019) 1.302(0.027) -2.026(0.050) 5.760(0.000)
-7 -3.353(0.008) 1.129(0.029) -3.061(0.010) 9.435(0.000)
-6 -2.843(0.014) 2.318(0.015) -2.306(0.029) 10.898(0.000)
-5 -2.288(0.031) 0.369(0.070) -1.774(0.065) 10.858(0.000)
-4 -1.948(0.039) 2.561(0.005) -1.421(0.068) 12.938(0.000)
-3 -2.120(0.032) 0.452(0.076) -2.041(0.034) 16.920(0.000)
-2 0.000(0.457) 2.301(0.013) 0.137(0.097) 20.522(0.000)
-1 12.335(0.000) 6.407(0.000) 12.448(0.000) 23.740(0.000)
0 47.979(0.000) 27.872(0.000) 48.162(0.000) 97.082(0.000)
1 39.587(0.000) 25.721(0.000) 40.299(0.000) 77.261(0.000)
2 19.538(0.000) 14.211(0.000) 19.134(0.000) 44.409(0.000)
3 13.008(0.000) 9.185(0.000) 13.655(0.000) 30.574(0.000)
4 10.175(0.000) 7.072(0.000) 10.418(0.000) 23.207(0.000)
5 8.741(0.000) 5.946(0.000) 8.936(0.000) 21.624(0.000)
6 6.014(0.000) 6.045(0.000) 6.389(0.000) 17.266(0.000)
7 4.656(0.002) 3.424(0.007) 5.100(0.001) 14.350(0.000)
8 2.738(0.006) 2.480(0.013) 2.860(0.006) 12.512(0.000)
9 3.775(0.004) 1.613(0.042) 3.913(0.003) 8.907(0.000)
t=10 4.260(0.000) 1.394(0.037) 4.333(0.000) 9.541(0.000)
Average of t=[-10, -3] -2.391(0.001) 1.111(0.003) -2.030(0.001) 9.286(0.000)
The abnormal turnover around each announcement from the companies in
the NYSE and the AMEX between 1986 and 1997 is the percentage change
between the annualized percentage turnover and the median annualized
percentage turnover from t = –40 to t = –11. The p-values in parentheses are
estimated from the bootstrapped distribution with 1000 iterations. They
stand for the tail probability of the smaller side, i.e., their maximum is 0.5.


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































characteristics, I match companies in the earnings
announcement sample and in the acquiring or the target
announcement sample. However, the result from the matching
sample shows a stronger pattern of decreasing trading volume
only before an earnings announcement, as in Table 9. Before
matching, the average of the median abnormal turnover from t =
–10 to t = –3 is –2.281%. It is slightly increased to –2.391% when
the data are matched with the acquiring announcement sample
and slightly decreased into –2.030% when the data are matched
with the target announcement sample.
For the normal level of turnover, the estimation window in this
paper is the period from t = –40 to t = –11. As a robustness
check, I attach a summarized table in Panel A of Table 10 from a
longer estimation window from t = –55 to t = 11. In this table,
the result is greatly strengthened, with –3.107% decrease from
the normal level of turnover.
Another robustness check involves the use of median and the
bootstrapped distribution. In Panel B of Table 10, I apply a
conventional approach of an event study where the mean
abnormal measure and the t-distribution are used.17) The
difference of the natural log of turnover and the natural log of
the normal level turnover is statistically significantly negative
only before an earnings announcement.
As a robustness check of the stability of this specific pattern, I
provide the subperiod results in Panel C of Table 10. Among
three subperiods, only in the earliest period of 1986-1989, the
significance level is 5%. In the other two subperiods, the median
abnormal turnover is decreased around 2-3% with less than 1%
significance level. Before either an acquiring or a target
announcement, I do not observe this interesting and intuitive
trading volume pattern.
5. Conclusion
Using the I/B/E/S earnings announcement and the SDC
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17) In order to deal with the skewness of turnover, I use the natural log. Because
there are many zero turnovers in the sample, I use the negative value of the
maximum of log(turnover) for the value of log(zero turnover). This will make
the entire distribution almost symmetric.
takeover announcement data from 1986 to 1997, I find that the
decreasing trading volume exists only before a scheduled
earnings announcement. Constructing a simple and intuitive
model, this interesting pattern of trading volume can be
explained as resulting from the information asymmetry and the
trading behavior of discretionary liquidity traders. I relate the
trading volume pattern with proxies of the ex ante information
asymmetry. The proxies such as analyst coverage, size, and
industry categorization are all correspondingly related with the
trading volume only before a scheduled announcement.
However, between analyst coverage and size, analyst coverage
shows a clearer cross-sectional relationship with the trading
volume pattern.
I investigate the trading volume and risk measures(volatility
and risk) to differentiate two possible explanations of the
decreasing trading volume: the information asymmetry
explanation vs. the risk-based explanation. The result from the
investigation of risk measures excludes the latter explanation.
Also, following the logic of the model, the absolute return divided
by turnover(a measure of price sensitivity) increases only before
an earnings announcement; this makes the information
asymmetry explanation, as in the model, much more plausible.
The robustness of the methodologies in this study has been
carefully probed, and I believe that I have shown an
economically intuitive trading volume pattern to be related to
another kind of hitherto unexplored information, the timing
information. Even with different estimation windows, mean
abnormal log turnover, and varying sub-periods, the main result
of this paper is preserved. Unlike most anomalies in financial
economics, this specific pattern seems to be even more
pronounced in recent sub-periods.
I conclude that the timing information provides discretionary
liquidity traders with an opportunity for trading optimization
under information asymmetry and that this causes a decrease of
trading volume only before a scheduled announcement. Two
remaining questions of interest, the return implication of this
timing information asymmetry and the identification of escaping
traders using a specific data set, will be explored in my further
research in progress.
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Appendix
Since the current model is a modified model from Admati and
Pfleiderer(1988) or Kyle(1984, 1985), so my notation conforms
with that in Admati and Pfeiderer(1988) or Kyle(1984, 1985).
Proof of Lemma 1
To calculate the aggressiveness of trading by informed traders
(β) and the price sensitivity to the order flow of the market maker
(λ), we need to use two conditions; informed traders’ expected
profit maximization and the market maker’s zero profit
condition.





The ith informed investor will conjecture the market order of
other N – 1 informed traders as β(δ̃ + ε̃ ). Therefore, the total
order flow is xi + (N – 1)β( δ̃ + ε̃ ) + ỹ + z̃. So, ith informed investors
will choose xi to maximize 
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Since this should be equal to β(δ̃ + ε̃), the aggressiveness of
informed traders (β) will be 
(A5)
The information set for informed investors is a noisy signal (δ̃ +
ε̃) and the conditional expectation of the order flow of DLT and
NLT are zero on this signal, so the profits maximization for
informed traders will not be changed from an unscheduled
announcement case to scheduled announcement case. However,
the market maker’s pricing problem will be changed since her
information set is order flow (w̃). The investigation for an
unscheduled announcement case, a benchmark case, and a
scheduled announcement case follows.
First, before unscheduled announcements, discretionary
liquidity traders cannot behave as discretionary liquidity traders
(ỹ) since they cannot detect an incoming announcement, they
will behave as naive traders (z̃ ). Therefore, the market maker’s
observed order flow will be 
(A7)
In a competitive market making industry, the expected profit
should be zero. This implies
(A8)
So, the price sensitivity of order flow (λ) will be decided by
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With (A5) and (A9), the unique and positive price sensitivity of
order flow (λ) is found in a third order equation as (A10).
(A10)
Once the price sensitivity to order flow (λ) for an unscheduled
announcement case is found, the trading aggressiveness of
informed traders (β) will be as in (A11).
(A11)
Second, as a benchmark case, if there are initially no
discretionary liquidity traders (so, no ỹ in the model), there will
be only naive liquidity traders (z̃ ). This case can be understood
as the case with the lowest liquidity in the market. 
With similar informed traders’ profit maximization problem
and the market maker’s zero profit condition, the price
sensitivity to order flow (λ) and the trading aggressiveness of
informed traders (β) will be (A12) and (A13), respectively.
(A12)
(A13)
Third, with a scheduled announcement, the market maker will
consider the existence of discretionary liquidity traders when
she decides the price. Therefore, the market maker’s observed
order flow will be 
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In (A14), DLT’s react to the price sensitivity from the market
maker, since they know there will be an upcoming
announcement and they are keen to the movement of the price
in the market. So, when the price sensitivity is zero, they will
take part in the market as they do before an unscheduled
announcement. However, as the price sensitivity increases, they
will participate in the market less and less. When the price
sensitivity is the same as that of the bench mark case (i.e. the
highest possible price sensitivity in the market), all DLT’s will
escape from the market. 
With order flow information as in (A14), the market maker will
decide the price as in (A15)
(A15)
So, the price sensitivity of order flow (λ) will be decided by
covariance of dividend in the future and order flow and variance
of order flow.
(A16)
With (A5) and (A16), the unique and positive price sensitivity
of order flow (λ) is found in a fourth order equation as (A10) with
reasonable values of parameters (i.e. Var[ỹ ] ≤ 8∙Var[z̃ ]).
(A17)
Once the price sensitivity to order flow (λ) for an unscheduled
announcement case is found, the trading aggressiveness of
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